irdb/PROGRESS.md

M01 — Monorepo skeleton (done)

Built: repo layout per SPEC §11, both Dockerfiles, compose stack, toolchain.

Notes for next milestone:

• DB schema empty; M02 owns all tables and seeds.
• entrypoint.sh for api supports migrate mode and calls vendor/bin/phinx.
• Healthcheck payloads are stubs; later milestones extend them.
• Service-token bootstrap deferred to M03 (needs api_tokens table first).
• CI runs locally via ./scripts/ci.sh (Docker-based, no host PHP/Node needed). No GitHub Actions workflow per project decision.
• composer.json config pins platform.php to 8.3 in both subprojects so dependency resolution matches the FrankenPHP runtime image even when the build host's composer:2 image ships a newer PHP.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies beyond SPEC §2: none.

M02 — Database & migrations (done)

Built: all SPEC §4 tables; idempotent seeds; IP/CIDR value objects.

Schema notes for next milestone:

• users.password_hash is NOT in the schema (per SPEC §4; UI owns local-admin credentials).
• api_tokens.kind enum values: reporter, consumer, admin, service (CHECK constraint enforced on both SQLite and MySQL: kind=reporter→reporter_id set & consumer_id null; kind=consumer→consumer_id set & reporter_id null; kind∈{admin,service}→both null).
• All timestamps stored UTC. ISO 8601 strings on SQLite, DATETIME(6) on MySQL. Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP / CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(6) accordingly.
• ip_bin always 16 bytes; v4 mapped to ::ffff:0:0/96. Use App\Domain\Ip\IpAddress::fromString() for normalization and Cidr::fromString() for subnets. Internally CIDRs store v4 prefixes as 96 + originalPrefix for unified containment math.
• DBAL Connection is wired through App\App\Container::build() and applies the four SQLite PRAGMAs (journal_mode=WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, busy_timeout=5000, foreign_keys=ON) on every new SQLite connection.
• Phinx migrations extend App\Infrastructure\Db\Migrations\BaseMigration for adapter-aware timestamp/binary column helpers. The phinxlog table is unaffected.

Decisions made:

• FK ON DELETE semantics:
  • policy_category_thresholds.policy_id → CASCADE (thresholds belong to policy).
  • policy_category_thresholds.category_id → RESTRICT (cannot drop a category in active use).
  • consumers.policy_id → RESTRICT (cannot drop a policy in active use).
  • reporters/consumers/manual_blocks/allowlist.created_by_user_id → SET NULL (preserve provenance after user delete).
  • api_tokens.{reporter_id,consumer_id} → CASCADE (deleting a reporter/consumer revokes its tokens).
  • reports.{category_id,reporter_id} → RESTRICT (preserve audit trail per SPEC hint).
  • ip_scores.category_id → CASCADE (scores meaningless without their category).
• api_tokens is created via raw CREATE TABLE per adapter so the CHECK constraint on kind works on SQLite (which cannot ADD CHECK via ALTER TABLE) and on MySQL.
• BINARY(16) on MySQL is implemented as Phinx's portable binary type with limit => 16 (yields VARBINARY(16)); this is functionally identical for our fixed-width 16-byte payload and avoids per-adapter raw SQL.
• Fixed an M01 bug in config/phinx.php where rtrim($path, '.sqlite') mangled the SQLite path because rtrim's second arg is a character set; switched to passing the full path verbatim with empty suffix.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none beyond SPEC §2.

M03 — API auth foundations (done)

Built: token kinds, hashing, RBAC, impersonation pattern, auth endpoints, service token bootstrap.

API contract decisions:

• 401 = bad/expired/revoked/wrong-kind token (uniform body {"error":"unauthorized"})
• 403 = authenticated but wrong role
• 400 = service token without (or malformed) X-Acting-User-Id header
• last_used_at updated synchronously (move to async in M14 if perf demands)
• /api/v1/auth/* is service-token-only with no impersonation — these endpoints exist to bootstrap user records the UI can later impersonate, so requiring impersonation would be circular. The controller enforces kind=service directly.
• X-Acting-User-Id is silently ignored on non-service tokens (per SPEC §8); only its absence on a service token triggers 400.

Notes for next milestone:

• Reporter and consumer tokens have no role column; their auth carries reporter_id / consumer_id only. Reading principal->reporterId from request attrs is how M04's report endpoint will identify the reporter.
• Admin endpoints in later milestones can use RbacMiddleware::require($responseFactory, Role::Operator) etc. — the factory takes the role; the response factory is in the container.
• AuthenticatedPrincipal carries an optional userId so M14 can introduce admin-token-bound-to-user without churn.

Schema deviation: api_tokens.role (nullable VARCHAR(32)) was added in migration 20260428130000_add_role_to_api_tokens.php. SPEC §4 doesn't enumerate it but SPEC §6 mandates that admin tokens carry a role; the column stores it. Non-admin token rows leave it NULL.

Token format: irdb_<kind3>_<32 base32 chars>, where kind3 is one of rep|con|adm|svc. 160 bits of entropy from random_bytes(20). The whole raw string is SHA-256 hashed for storage; token_prefix keeps the first 8 chars (irdb_<kind3>) for log readability. The .env.example documents how to generate a valid UI_SERVICE_TOKEN via TokenIssuer.

Service-token rotation: out of scope this milestone — ServiceTokenBootstrap only handles "set or not set". Rotation means: deploy with the new value, restart api, manually revoke the old hash via a future tool. The bootstrap logs a warning when it inserts a new service token while another already exists.

Added dependencies: none.

M04 — Token system & ingest (done)

Built: reporter/consumer/token CRUD; POST /api/v1/report end-to-end; rate limiter; decay functions.

Notes for next milestone:

• Synchronous score updates are correct but only touch the (ip, category) pair just reported. Bulk decay re-application is M05's recompute job.
• PairScorer (api/src/Domain/Reputation/PairScorer.php) is the authoritative single-pair scorer; the bulk recompute job in M05 should call into it (or a near-clone) so behavior stays consistent. It depends on Clock, CategoryRepository, and ReportRepository::forScoring().
• Decay shapes live as pure functions in Decay::value(DecayFunction, ageDays, decayParam) with seven unit tests against hand-computed reference values. M05's recompute will reuse this.
• Rate limiter is in-process (PHP array on a singleton RateLimiter); document this in README. Multi-replica deployments need a shared store. The bucket capacity is API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SECOND × 2 with refill = API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SECOND per second; on exhaustion the middleware emits 429 with Retry-After: 1. Skipped on admin/auth routes.
• Service tokens cannot be created via the admin API (kind=service → 400) and are filtered out of the list endpoint unconditionally; only the bootstrap path makes them. Revoke on a service token returns 403 from DELETE /api/v1/admin/tokens/{id}.
• Tokens raw value appears only in the create response payload (raw_token); we persist its SHA-256 hash and the 8-char prefix.
• ip_scores upsert is per-driver: SQLite uses ON CONFLICT(ip_bin, category_id) DO UPDATE, MySQL uses ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE. Single helper in IpScoreRepository::upsert().
• Clock interface (App\Domain\Time\Clock) wraps wall-time for received_at, decay age, and rate-limit refill. SystemClock in production; FixedClock (with advance()) in tests.

API contract decisions:

• Admin endpoints (/api/v1/admin/{reporters,consumers,tokens}) require Admin role. RBAC is enforced via RbacMiddleware::require($rf, Role::Admin) on the route group.
• Validation errors return 400 with {"error":"validation_failed","details":{"field":"reason"}}. Hand-rolled validators per controller — small surface, no third-party validator added.
• DELETE on a reporter with existing reports returns 409 and flips is_active=false (soft delete) rather than removing the row; the audit trail is preserved per the FK RESTRICT semantics on reports.reporter_id.
• Public POST /api/v1/report — wrong-kind tokens (admin/consumer/service) and inactive reporters both return 401 with the uniform {"error":"unauthorized"} envelope, matching the M03 convention. Bad IP / unknown category / oversized metadata return 400 with the validation envelope.
• Metadata size limit: 4 KB after json_encode. Non-object metadata (arrays, scalars) is rejected.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none (chose hand-rolled validation over respect/validation).

M05 — Reputation engine & jobs (done)

Built: decay math (already in M04, edge-cases re-verified); job framework with atomic locks (JobLockRepository), run history (JobRunRepository), runner abstraction (JobRunner), registry (JobRegistry); concrete jobs RecomputeScoresJob (full + incremental), CleanupAuditJob, EnrichPendingJob (skeleton); TickJob dispatcher; /internal/jobs/{recompute-scores,cleanup-audit,enrich-pending,tick,refresh-geoip,status} endpoints behind InternalNetworkMiddleware + InternalTokenMiddleware; CLI jobs:run, jobs:status, scores:rebuild.

Notes for next milestone:

• PairScorer (from M04) is reused by RecomputeScoresJob — both produce identical scores for the same pair.
• EnrichPendingJob is a skeleton — M11 fills it in.
• refresh-geoip endpoint returns 412 with {"error":"not_implemented"} — M11 wires it up.
• Job results are returned synchronously; long jobs may exceed default request timeout. The /internal/* routes need an extended max_execution_time in production FrankenPHP config (deferred — current default is sufficient for the recompute's 240s ceiling).
• Drop rule: score < 0.01 AND last_report_at < now − 90 days. RecomputeScoresJob backdates last_report_at to now − 366 days for orphan ip_scores rows (no surviving reports) so the same drop pass prunes them.
• triggered_by convention: HTTP /internal/jobs/* calls use 'schedule' (assumed cron-driven); CLI uses 'manual'. The admin-API wrapper in M12 will pass 'manual' through for UI button triggers.
• TickJob takes a Closure(): iterable<Job> rather than a direct JobRegistry reference — needed to break a build-time cycle in PHP-DI (registry holds tick; tick iterates registry). The closure is invoked at run time.
• JobsController resolves jobs via JobRegistry::get($name), and the registry is populated lazily in the container factory in registration order: recompute, cleanup, enrich, tick.
• Lock owner format: <pid>/<random hex>. Release verifies owner matches before deleting — defensive against expires_at-reclaim races.
• Internal token middleware fails closed when INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN is empty — better than silently exposing endpoints to anything inside the docker network.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none.