irdb/compose.scheduler.yml

services:
  scheduler:
    image: irdb-scheduler:latest
    build: { context: ./scheduler }
    environment:
      INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN: ${INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN}
    # SEC_REVIEW F22: dependencies (curl, tini, ca-certificates) are now
    # baked into the image at build time with pinned versions, against a
    # digest-pinned alpine base. The previous `image: alpine:3` +
    # `apk add` at container start trusted the apk mirror on every
    # restart and would have given a mirror compromise a foothold in the
    # container that holds INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN.
    read_only: true
    # busybox crond writes a tiny tempfile when the schedule fires; /run
    # has to be writable for that. Everything else stays read-only.
    tmpfs:
      - /run:mode=0755
      - /tmp:mode=1777
    # busybox crond calls initgroups() before each exec, which needs
    # CAP_SETGID even when the target user is the same root it is
    # already running as — full cap_drop crashes it with
    # "can't set groups: Operation not permitted". Hardening the
    # process to non-root would mean shipping a custom cron binary;
    # not worth the maintenance cost given the container has no
    # persistent volume, no exposed port, and only INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN
    # in env. `no-new-privileges` is still useful: there is no setuid
    # binary in the image and we want to keep it that way.
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true
    depends_on:
      api:
        condition: service_healthy
    restart: unless-stopped