irdb/PROGRESS.md

M01 — Monorepo skeleton (done)

Built: repo layout per SPEC §11, both Dockerfiles, compose stack, toolchain.

Notes for next milestone:

• DB schema empty; M02 owns all tables and seeds.
• entrypoint.sh for api supports migrate mode and calls vendor/bin/phinx.
• Healthcheck payloads are stubs; later milestones extend them.
• Service-token bootstrap deferred to M03 (needs api_tokens table first).
• CI runs locally via ./scripts/ci.sh (Docker-based, no host PHP/Node needed). No GitHub Actions workflow per project decision.
• composer.json config pins platform.php to 8.3 in both subprojects so dependency resolution matches the FrankenPHP runtime image even when the build host's composer:2 image ships a newer PHP.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies beyond SPEC §2: none.

M02 — Database & migrations (done)

Built: all SPEC §4 tables; idempotent seeds; IP/CIDR value objects.

Schema notes for next milestone:

• users.password_hash is NOT in the schema (per SPEC §4; UI owns local-admin credentials).
• api_tokens.kind enum values: reporter, consumer, admin, service (CHECK constraint enforced on both SQLite and MySQL: kind=reporter→reporter_id set & consumer_id null; kind=consumer→consumer_id set & reporter_id null; kind∈{admin,service}→both null).
• All timestamps stored UTC. ISO 8601 strings on SQLite, DATETIME(6) on MySQL. Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP / CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(6) accordingly.
• ip_bin always 16 bytes; v4 mapped to ::ffff:0:0/96. Use App\Domain\Ip\IpAddress::fromString() for normalization and Cidr::fromString() for subnets. Internally CIDRs store v4 prefixes as 96 + originalPrefix for unified containment math.
• DBAL Connection is wired through App\App\Container::build() and applies the four SQLite PRAGMAs (journal_mode=WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, busy_timeout=5000, foreign_keys=ON) on every new SQLite connection.
• Phinx migrations extend App\Infrastructure\Db\Migrations\BaseMigration for adapter-aware timestamp/binary column helpers. The phinxlog table is unaffected.

Decisions made:

• FK ON DELETE semantics:
  • policy_category_thresholds.policy_id → CASCADE (thresholds belong to policy).
  • policy_category_thresholds.category_id → RESTRICT (cannot drop a category in active use).
  • consumers.policy_id → RESTRICT (cannot drop a policy in active use).
  • reporters/consumers/manual_blocks/allowlist.created_by_user_id → SET NULL (preserve provenance after user delete).
  • api_tokens.{reporter_id,consumer_id} → CASCADE (deleting a reporter/consumer revokes its tokens).
  • reports.{category_id,reporter_id} → RESTRICT (preserve audit trail per SPEC hint).
  • ip_scores.category_id → CASCADE (scores meaningless without their category).
• api_tokens is created via raw CREATE TABLE per adapter so the CHECK constraint on kind works on SQLite (which cannot ADD CHECK via ALTER TABLE) and on MySQL.
• BINARY(16) on MySQL is implemented as Phinx's portable binary type with limit => 16 (yields VARBINARY(16)); this is functionally identical for our fixed-width 16-byte payload and avoids per-adapter raw SQL.
• Fixed an M01 bug in config/phinx.php where rtrim($path, '.sqlite') mangled the SQLite path because rtrim's second arg is a character set; switched to passing the full path verbatim with empty suffix.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none beyond SPEC §2.

M03 — API auth foundations (done)

Built: token kinds, hashing, RBAC, impersonation pattern, auth endpoints, service token bootstrap.

API contract decisions:

• 401 = bad/expired/revoked/wrong-kind token (uniform body {"error":"unauthorized"})
• 403 = authenticated but wrong role
• 400 = service token without (or malformed) X-Acting-User-Id header
• last_used_at updated synchronously (move to async in M14 if perf demands)
• /api/v1/auth/* is service-token-only with no impersonation — these endpoints exist to bootstrap user records the UI can later impersonate, so requiring impersonation would be circular. The controller enforces kind=service directly.
• X-Acting-User-Id is silently ignored on non-service tokens (per SPEC §8); only its absence on a service token triggers 400.

Notes for next milestone:

• Reporter and consumer tokens have no role column; their auth carries reporter_id / consumer_id only. Reading principal->reporterId from request attrs is how M04's report endpoint will identify the reporter.
• Admin endpoints in later milestones can use RbacMiddleware::require($responseFactory, Role::Operator) etc. — the factory takes the role; the response factory is in the container.
• AuthenticatedPrincipal carries an optional userId so M14 can introduce admin-token-bound-to-user without churn.

Schema deviation: api_tokens.role (nullable VARCHAR(32)) was added in migration 20260428130000_add_role_to_api_tokens.php. SPEC §4 doesn't enumerate it but SPEC §6 mandates that admin tokens carry a role; the column stores it. Non-admin token rows leave it NULL.

Token format: irdb_<kind3>_<32 base32 chars>, where kind3 is one of rep|con|adm|svc. 160 bits of entropy from random_bytes(20). The whole raw string is SHA-256 hashed for storage; token_prefix keeps the first 8 chars (irdb_<kind3>) for log readability. The .env.example documents how to generate a valid UI_SERVICE_TOKEN via TokenIssuer.

Service-token rotation: out of scope this milestone — ServiceTokenBootstrap only handles "set or not set". Rotation means: deploy with the new value, restart api, manually revoke the old hash via a future tool. The bootstrap logs a warning when it inserts a new service token while another already exists.

Added dependencies: none.

M04 — Token system & ingest (done)

Built: reporter/consumer/token CRUD; POST /api/v1/report end-to-end; rate limiter; decay functions.

Notes for next milestone:

• Synchronous score updates are correct but only touch the (ip, category) pair just reported. Bulk decay re-application is M05's recompute job.
• PairScorer (api/src/Domain/Reputation/PairScorer.php) is the authoritative single-pair scorer; the bulk recompute job in M05 should call into it (or a near-clone) so behavior stays consistent. It depends on Clock, CategoryRepository, and ReportRepository::forScoring().
• Decay shapes live as pure functions in Decay::value(DecayFunction, ageDays, decayParam) with seven unit tests against hand-computed reference values. M05's recompute will reuse this.
• Rate limiter is in-process (PHP array on a singleton RateLimiter); document this in README. Multi-replica deployments need a shared store. The bucket capacity is API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SECOND × 2 with refill = API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SECOND per second; on exhaustion the middleware emits 429 with Retry-After: 1. Skipped on admin/auth routes.
• Service tokens cannot be created via the admin API (kind=service → 400) and are filtered out of the list endpoint unconditionally; only the bootstrap path makes them. Revoke on a service token returns 403 from DELETE /api/v1/admin/tokens/{id}.
• Tokens raw value appears only in the create response payload (raw_token); we persist its SHA-256 hash and the 8-char prefix.
• ip_scores upsert is per-driver: SQLite uses ON CONFLICT(ip_bin, category_id) DO UPDATE, MySQL uses ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE. Single helper in IpScoreRepository::upsert().
• Clock interface (App\Domain\Time\Clock) wraps wall-time for received_at, decay age, and rate-limit refill. SystemClock in production; FixedClock (with advance()) in tests.

API contract decisions:

• Admin endpoints (/api/v1/admin/{reporters,consumers,tokens}) require Admin role. RBAC is enforced via RbacMiddleware::require($rf, Role::Admin) on the route group.
• Validation errors return 400 with {"error":"validation_failed","details":{"field":"reason"}}. Hand-rolled validators per controller — small surface, no third-party validator added.
• DELETE on a reporter with existing reports returns 409 and flips is_active=false (soft delete) rather than removing the row; the audit trail is preserved per the FK RESTRICT semantics on reports.reporter_id.
• Public POST /api/v1/report — wrong-kind tokens (admin/consumer/service) and inactive reporters both return 401 with the uniform {"error":"unauthorized"} envelope, matching the M03 convention. Bad IP / unknown category / oversized metadata return 400 with the validation envelope.
• Metadata size limit: 4 KB after json_encode. Non-object metadata (arrays, scalars) is rejected.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none (chose hand-rolled validation over respect/validation).

M05 — Reputation engine & jobs (done)

Built: decay math (already in M04, edge-cases re-verified); job framework with atomic locks (JobLockRepository), run history (JobRunRepository), runner abstraction (JobRunner), registry (JobRegistry); concrete jobs RecomputeScoresJob (full + incremental), CleanupAuditJob, EnrichPendingJob (skeleton); TickJob dispatcher; /internal/jobs/{recompute-scores,cleanup-audit,enrich-pending,tick,refresh-geoip,status} endpoints behind InternalNetworkMiddleware + InternalTokenMiddleware; CLI jobs:run, jobs:status, scores:rebuild.

Notes for next milestone:

• PairScorer (from M04) is reused by RecomputeScoresJob — both produce identical scores for the same pair.
• EnrichPendingJob is a skeleton — M11 fills it in.
• refresh-geoip endpoint returns 412 with {"error":"not_implemented"} — M11 wires it up.
• Job results are returned synchronously; long jobs may exceed default request timeout. The /internal/* routes need an extended max_execution_time in production FrankenPHP config (deferred — current default is sufficient for the recompute's 240s ceiling).
• Drop rule: score < 0.01 AND last_report_at < now − 90 days. RecomputeScoresJob backdates last_report_at to now − 366 days for orphan ip_scores rows (no surviving reports) so the same drop pass prunes them.
• triggered_by convention: HTTP /internal/jobs/* calls use 'schedule' (assumed cron-driven); CLI uses 'manual'. The admin-API wrapper in M12 will pass 'manual' through for UI button triggers.
• TickJob takes a Closure(): iterable<Job> rather than a direct JobRegistry reference — needed to break a build-time cycle in PHP-DI (registry holds tick; tick iterates registry). The closure is invoked at run time.
• JobsController resolves jobs via JobRegistry::get($name), and the registry is populated lazily in the container factory in registration order: recompute, cleanup, enrich, tick.
• Lock owner format: <pid>/<random hex>. Release verifies owner matches before deleting — defensive against expires_at-reclaim races.
• Internal token middleware fails closed when INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN is empty — better than silently exposing endpoints to anything inside the docker network.

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none.

M06 — Manual blocks, allowlist (done)

Built: CRUD for manual_blocks and allowlist (single-IP and CIDR, v4 + v6); CidrEvaluator (in-process containment over a snapshot); CidrEvaluatorFactory (60s TTL cache + invalidate on writes); EffectiveStatusService (allowlist + manual; score+policy lands in M07); SPEC §M06 acceptance script passes end-to-end.

Notes for next milestone:

• M07 wires CidrEvaluatorFactory into the distribution endpoint and finishes EffectiveStatusService by adding score-vs-policy evaluation. Inject CategoryRepository, IpScoreRepository, and the per-policy thresholds into the service alongside the existing evaluator.
• Cache TTL is CIDR_EVALUATOR_TTL_SECONDS (default 60s); mutation endpoints invalidate explicitly and force a synchronous rebuild (get()) so an overlap WARNING fires inside the same request — operators see immediate feedback. Multi-replica deployments will see up to 60s of staleness across replicas — accepted.
• Manual-block expiration cleanup: data model has expires_at, repo has findExpired($now) returning ids, but no job runs. Add in M14 hardening if desired, or leave as a documented limitation.
• CIDR canonicalization picks recommendation (c) from the milestone doc: non-canonical input is silently normalized; the response body echoes normalized_from: <original> only when the normalization changed the input. Canonical input omits the field.
• Repository inserts go through RepositoryBase::insertRow() for the binary-column ergonomics, but insertRow() returns executeStatement()'s row count — not the new id. The repos call (int) $this->connection()->lastInsertId() after insertRow() to recover the id. Same pattern ReportRepository::insert uses — kept consistent.
• Cidr::fromBinary($networkBin, $unifiedPrefix) was added so repositories can hydrate stored rows back into the value object. The v4-vs-v6 heuristic mirrors what IpAddress::fromBinary does (v4-mapped IPv6 prefix + unified prefix ≥ 96 ⇒ render as v4).
• CidrEvaluatorFactory is intentionally not final — EffectiveStatusServiceTest substitutes an in-memory stub via subclass to avoid spinning up the DB.
• RBAC split per SPEC §6: list/show ⇒ Viewer, create/delete ⇒ Operator. Achieved with per-route RbacMiddleware::require(...) rather than group-level — a small departure from the all-Admin pattern used by reporters/consumers/tokens but the cleanest expression of "the same URL has different role requirements per method".

Deviations from SPEC: none. Added dependencies: none.

M07 — Policies & distribution (done)

Built: policy CRUD with thresholds (replaces wholesale on PATCH); GET /api/v1/blocklist (text/plain + JSON) with ETag/If-None-Match round-trip; per-policy in-memory cache (30s TTL, invalidated on relevant mutations); BlocklistBuilder with allowlist filtering, manual-block dedup (broader CIDR wins), v4-then-v6 stable sort; per-policy preview endpoint; perf test 50k entries <500 ms (SQLite + JIT).

Notes for next milestone:

• Per-policy cache TTL = 30 s (BLOCKLIST_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS). Mutation endpoints invalidate explicitly: policy CRUD calls BlocklistCache::invalidate($policyId); manual_blocks / allowlist mutations call invalidateAll() (any policy might include manual blocks). Multi-replica deployments will see up to 30 s of cross-replica staleness — accepted, mirrors CidrEvaluatorFactory semantics.
• The text/plain format is universal (one IP/CIDR per line, no comments). Firewall-specific consumers transform on their side; M13 ships examples in examples/consumers/.
• DELETE on a policy with referencing consumers returns 409 with {"error":"policy_in_use","consumers":[{id,name},...]}. Cascade is wrong here per SPEC §M07.2.
• Dedup rule: scored single-IPs covered by a manual subnet are dropped (the broader subnet entry covers them). For same-IP overlap (scored single AND manual single), the scored entry wins to keep category attribution.
• Allowlist precedence: a manual subnet whose network address sits inside an allowlisted IP/subnet is dropped from the output. Manual single IPs on the allowlist are filtered too. The CidrEvaluator already logs a WARNING when the two lists overlap.
• ETag stability: SHA-256 over the rendered body (excluding generated_at). Different content-types yield different ETags by design (text vs JSON have different bodies).
• If-None-Match parsing handles weak validators (W/"…") and the wildcard *.
• Policies controller's PATCH replaces the threshold set wholesale inside a single transaction (PolicyRepository::replaceThresholds — DELETE then INSERT). Field-level edits to name/description/include_manual_blocks happen alongside in the same request when present.
• Threshold body shape: {<category_slug>: <number>}; the controller resolves slugs to category ids. Unknown slug returns a 400 with the offending slug in the error message.
• BlocklistBuilder exposes the build via BlocklistCache::getOrBuild($policy); the public endpoint never builds directly. Preview endpoint bypasses the cache (calls the builder directly) so the UI sees fresh numbers after edits.
• IpScoreRepository::findExceedingThresholds returns raw associative-array rows (not typed) — the BlocklistBuilder's hot loop casts on demand. Saves ~25 % off the perf budget at 50k rows.

Performance:

• SPEC §M07.5 budget: 50k entries < 500 ms. Measured warm path on SQLite + opcache JIT (matches production FrankenPHP): 440–460 ms across 5 consecutive runs (median ~444 ms).
• Without JIT (raw vendor/bin/phpunit --group perf) the same workload takes ~530 ms. The composer test-perf script enables JIT (-d opcache.enable_cli=1 -d opcache.jit_buffer_size=64M -d opcache.jit=tracing) so CI matches the production runtime.
• Three key optimisations beat the budget: (a) subnets indexed by prefix length so containment is applyMaskFast + isset() rather than per-pair Cidr::contains(); (b) ksort on binary keys (one per family) instead of usort with a closure — closure dispatch dominates at 50k entries; (c) parallel hashes (ipText, categoriesByIp, maxScoreByIp) keyed on ip_bin instead of nested [] rows, so the row-merge loop avoids the per-iteration nested-array allocation.
• MySQL number not yet measured — to be captured separately when the MySQL CI lane is wired up.

Schema: none — uses the M02 policies and policy_category_thresholds tables as-is.

Test surface added: tests/Unit/Reputation/PolicyEvaluatorTest.php, tests/Integration/Admin/PoliciesControllerTest.php, tests/Integration/Public/BlocklistControllerTest.php, tests/Integration/Reputation/BlocklistBuilderTest.php, tests/Integration/Perf/BlocklistPerfTest.php. Total +28 tests / +95 assertions; perf test excluded from default run via #[Group('perf')]. Suite passes 271 tests / 723 assertions, 0 deprecations.

Acceptance script: ran end-to-end against compose stack. Empty blocklist → 200 with empty body; manual block emits as CIDR; JSON format returns reason="manual"; ETag round-trip returns 304; admin token rejected with 401; preview endpoint returns count + sample for all three seeded policies.

Deviations from SPEC:

• The migrate container's entrypoint runs Phinx migrations only; SPEC §10 says it should also run seeds. Pre-existing from M01, surfaced again here because M07's acceptance flow depends on the seeded policies. Worked around for the smoke test by running vendor/bin/phinx seed:run against the started container. Flagged for M13 polish (or earlier if another milestone is bitten by it).
• composer test script now passes --exclude-group perf so the default suite is fast; perf is run via composer test-perf with JIT enabled to match production.
• The PHPUnit doc-comment @group annotation was switched to the #[Group('perf')] attribute to silence a PHPUnit-12 deprecation warning.

Added dependencies: none.

M08 — UI scaffold & auth (done)

Built: UI base (Slim+Twig+Tailwind+Alpine+htmx with dark-mode FOUC-free toggle and sidebar/topnav), session manager (file-backed PHP sessions, 8h idle / 24h absolute), CSRF middleware (constant-time compare, header + form-field), ApiClient with auto Bearer + X-Acting-User-Id + retry-once-on-5xx + typed exceptions, AuthClient + AdminClient subclients, OIDC code-flow with PKCE via jumbojett/openid-connect-php, local admin login (Argon2id + 5-fail/30s session-scoped throttle), CSRF-protected logout, /app/me page, /no-access page, friendly Twig error template, doc/oidc.md Entra setup guide.

Notes for next milestone:

• AdminClient exposes only getMe(); M09 adds methods for IP search/detail, dashboard, etc.
• ApiClient exception types are stable: ApiAuthException (401/403), ApiValidationException (400/422 with details array), ApiNotFoundException (404), ApiServerException (5xx), ApiUnreachableException (network/timeout). M09+ catches them in controllers.
• Sidebar nav placeholders show their target milestone (M09/M10/M12). Replace each placeholder with a real link as the section ships.
• Dark mode persistence: localStorage.irdb-theme = 'dark' | 'light'. Inline <head> script reads it before paint; the toggle button ([data-theme-toggle]) writes it. System preference is the first-visit default via prefers-color-scheme.
• M14 will replace the basic 5/30 session-scoped throttle with a real brute-force lockout (IP-keyed, persistent).
• regenerateId() is called after every auth-state change (login success, logout) per SPEC §M08; defeats session fixation.
• POST handlers (/login/local, /logout) return 303 See Other on redirect so curl/browsers switch to GET. GET handlers stay at 302.
• Service-token + impersonation header invariant: every API call out of the UI carries Authorization: Bearer <UI_SERVICE_TOKEN> and (when a session user exists) X-Acting-User-Id: <user_id>. Auth endpoints (/api/v1/auth/*) are called WITHOUT the impersonation header by design — they exist to produce the user record we'd be impersonating.
• Config::validateOrExit() runs at boot and exits non-zero if UI_SERVICE_TOKEN/API_BASE_URL are missing or both auth methods are disabled. This means a misconfigured deployment crashes on docker compose up, not on the first user click.
• OidcAuthenticator is an interface (concrete impl JumbojettOidcAuthenticator); tests stub it to drive the OIDC controller's branches without a real IdP.
• Healthz remembers the most recent ApiClient call result via ApiHealth singleton; both fields are null until the UI has made its first API call.
• htmx config picks up the per-session CSRF token from the <meta name="csrf-token"> tag and sends X-CSRF-Token automatically — established now even though htmx isn't used yet, so M09 tables can rely on it.

Manual verification:

• Acceptance script ran end-to-end against compose stack with LOCAL_ADMIN_ENABLED=true: login page renders with "Sign in" button, /healthz returns 200, /app/me unauthed redirects to /login, GET /login → set CSRF + session cookie, POST /login/local with valid creds → 303 to /app/me showing "admin" role + "local" source, wrong password rejected with flash, missing CSRF token → 403, logout clears session and post-logout /app/me → 302 again.
• OIDC flow against a live tenant: NOT manually verified in this environment — no Entra tenant available. The flow is covered by integration tests with a stubbed OidcAuthenticator (success path, no-role/no-access path, handshake failure, api-down during upsert). Real-tenant verification deferred to the next operator with tenant access; doc/oidc.md documents the setup.

Operational gotchas observed:

• Docker Compose's .env file performs variable substitution on values, so an Argon2id hash containing $argon2id$v=19$… collapses unless every $ is doubled to $$. Documented inline in the .env.example instructions for M13 polish.
• curl -L together with -X POST does NOT switch the method to GET on a 303 response (the explicit -X overrides curl's default). Acceptance scripts and any curl-based tests should use -d alone (which implies POST and lets curl follow redirects with GET).

Test surface added (ui): 47 tests / 102 assertions.

• Unit: ApiClientTest (status-code mapping, retry-once, header injection, health tracking), SessionManagerTest (set/get/clear, flash, throttle, lockout), CsrfMiddlewareTest (skip on GET, header + form-field paths, 403 on missing/wrong token).
• Integration: LocalLoginTest (form render, success, wrong password, wrong username, missing CSRF, lockout after 5 fails, api-down handling), LogoutTest (success + missing-CSRF), OidcFlowTest (success, no-role → /no-access, handshake failure, api-down), RoutesTest (home redirect, healthz, /app/me gating, /no-access).

Deviations from SPEC:

• The TwigGlobalsMiddleware runs ahead of AuthRequiredMiddleware so anonymous /app/* requests still have csrf_token / flash / current_user globals available for the redirect-to-/login response — minor implementation detail, no functional difference.
• POST handlers return 303 instead of 302 (SPEC says "redirect"; standardised on 303 for state-changing redirects to avoid the curl -X POST -L resubmit-method behaviour).

Added dependencies:

• esbuild (devDependency, JS bundling for app.js). The SPEC §2 doesn't enumerate a JS bundler explicitly but allows "vanilla JS + Alpine.js + htmx where it simplifies forms"; the Tailwind-only build was insufficient since Alpine and htmx are imported modules. The Dockerfile build now runs both tailwindcss and esbuild.
• jumbojett/openid-connect-php was already in SPEC §2 / composer.json; it's just being USED for the first time in M08.

M09 — UI: IPs, history, dashboard (done)

Built: read-only IP browsing UI + matching admin endpoints. API: GET /api/v1/admin/ips (paginated search with q / category / score range / country / asn / status filters), GET /api/v1/admin/ips/{ip} (scores per category, enrichment placeholder, manual/allowlist panels, 200-entry history timeline with has_more), GET /api/v1/admin/stats/dashboard (active blocks + counters + 24h histogram + top reporters/categories + jobs status, 30s in-memory cache). UI: /app/dashboard, /app/ips, /app/ips/{ip}. Chart.js bundles via esbuild (tree-shaken to ~150kb of bar/linear pieces). Default post-login redirect now /app/dashboard. Sidebar highlights the active section.

Notes for next milestone:

• EffectiveStatusService was completed: it now distinguishes Scored (any non-zero score in ip_scores) from Clean (no rows or all zero). M07's policy-vs-score evaluation lives separately in PolicyEvaluator — the single-IP "is this scored?" question is policy-agnostic by design (you don't get to ask "scored against which policy?" when looking at one IP).
• Dashboard active_blocks is an approximation: distinct IPs in ip_scores with score > 0 PLUS single-IP manual_blocks. Computing the exact count of IPs in the seeded moderate policy's blocklist would require running BlocklistBuilder per request, which is too expensive for a 30s-cached dashboard. The number is a stable proxy; the response carries reference_policy: "moderate" to make the caveat explicit. M10/M12 may add a config knob.
• IP search is grounded in ip_scores — IPs that are only manually blocked (no reports yet) won't appear unless they have an ip_scores row. Manual subnets and allowlist subnets aren't expanded in search either; only single-IP entries from those tables intersect with the search via the status filter. The IP detail page shows the precise effective status. Documented limitation; a richer "show subnet members" view is out of scope.
• Country flag rendering uses the regional-indicator emoji pair ('🇦' ~ first ~ '🇦' ~ second). Browsers without flag-emoji fonts (some Windows configs) render it as block letters; the fallback when country_code is null is a ?? pill.
• Country / ASN columns are blank until M11 wires real GeoIP (the ip_enrichment table exists; the enrich-pending job is still a skeleton).
• Manual-block / allowlist mutation buttons on the IP detail page are deliberately absent here. M10 adds them.
• IpHistoryRepository UNIONs the three sources in PHP (separate queries → merge → sort) rather than in SQL — the per-source caps (500 reports max + small manual/allowlist tables) keep this fast at our dataset sizes; switching to a single SQL UNION ALL is straightforward if profiling later shows it matters.
• Lighthouse not measured here — the acceptance environment has no headless browser. The pages use semantic HTML (<table> with proper <thead>/<tbody>, labelled form inputs, aria-current="page" on the active sidebar link, contrast tokens that pass WCAG AA in both modes by Tailwind's defaults). M13 will run the actual Lighthouse pass.
• Slim's default segment regex disallows colons; /{ip:.+} is required for IPv6 paths to route on both the api and the ui.

Schema:

• idx_ip_scores_ip_text — single-column index on ip_scores.ip_text so the search's LIKE 'prefix%' path doesn't full-scan. LIKE '%substr%' falls back to a scan, acceptable at the dataset sizes covered by the SPEC.

Test surface added (api): tests/Integration/Admin/IpsControllerTest.php (10 tests covering list ordering, prefix filter, category filter, pagination, validation error, detail success/empty/404, enrichment-null-by-default), tests/Integration/Admin/StatsControllerTest.php (3 tests covering empty shape, non-empty counters, manual/allowlist counters). Updated EffectiveStatusServiceTest to cover the new Scored-when-rows-exist branch with stub IpScoreRepository. Total: 285 tests / 787 assertions.

Test surface added (ui): tests/Integration/App/DashboardPageTest.php (renders stats + chart canvas + degrades on api-down), tests/Integration/App/IpsPageTest.php (list, empty state, filter round-trip via form, detail page with scores+history, twig 404, anonymous redirect). Total: 55 tests / 133 assertions.

Acceptance script: ran end-to-end against compose stack. Seeded 3 reports across 3 IPs (mix of v4 + v6); local admin login → /app/dashboard renders with "reports", "Active blocks", "test-reporter", and the chart canvas; /app/ips lists all three IPs with brute_force as top category; ?q=2001 narrows to the v6 IP only; /app/ips/203.0.113.10 shows "Score per category" and "History" sections with brute_force; /app/ips/not-an-ip returns 404 with the friendly error template.

Deviations from SPEC:

• EffectiveStatusService had an unused-but-final wiring left over from M06; making it usable for M09 required a constructor change (+IpScoreRepository) and broke the Unit-level test that constructed it with one arg. Updated tests accordingly. The fix also required dropping IpScoreRepository's final modifier so test stubs can extend it — same pattern used for CidrEvaluatorFactory in M06.
• The dashboard active_blocks figure is an approximation (see notes above), not the exact "moderate-policy blocklist size" the SPEC mentions. The response carries reference_policy: "moderate" to call this out and makes a follow-up "switch to exact computation" trivial when M12 or beyond decides it's worth the cost.
• Sidebar's "My identity" link moved to the bottom of the nav (under the M10/M12 placeholders) since /app/dashboard is now the canonical landing page. Visual order only; no functional change.

Added dependencies:

• chart.js (npm dep). The SPEC's M09 doc explicitly allows it; tree-shaken to bar/linear/category controllers + element + tooltip + title via Chart.js's modular registration, keeping the impact at ~150kb of the final ~263kb bundle (Chart.js + Alpine + htmx + our own ~3kb).